PAT-9901-PHAN-SENSORARCHETYPE: Phantom Redundancy (Common-Mode Failure)
Dual Sensor Redundancy Tied to Single Processing Core
Sub-Type: Apparent Hardware Backup with Shared Logic Chokepoint
VEC:AUTH:0.72•COUP:0.91•LAT:0.68•OVR:0.85
Authority Gradient
0.72
Feedback Coupling
0.91
Telemetry Latency
0.68
Override Suppression
0.85
Structural Pattern Audit Brief
Critical Multi-Node (Level 4)PAT-9901-PHAN-SENSOR
Aircraft carries two physical angle-of-attack sensors, but software is architected to poll only one sensor per flight cycle, rendering hardware redundancy useless.
Failure Invariant Breach
Sensors [A, B] -> Flight_Computer (Hardcoded Single Channel Poll) -> Actuator
Absent Safety Recovery Mechanism
Real-time voting comparator and anomaly disengage interrupt
Fundamental Invariant Rules
INV-01:Physical sensor redundancy provides zero fault tolerance if downstream logic executes single-point polling without comparator voting.
Engineered Resilience & Mitigation Strategies
MIT-01:Hardware and software voting mechanisms across all redundant sensor banks
MIT-02:Automated fallback to raw manual pilot direct-law mode upon sensor disagreement
Canonical Incident Manifestations (2)
NIST-CVE-2020-8597Cloud Infrastructure & Networking
Cloudflare / Multi-Cloud Redundancy: Single Anycast DNS Routing Cascade Outage
Dual-node infrastructure designed for redundant failover shared an unmodeled single-point DNS Telemetry_Channel. Upstream channel failure disconnected both independent computation nodes simultaneously.
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CISA-FBI-2021-0507Critical Energy Infrastructure & Cyber
Colonial Pipeline: Single-Factor Legacy VPN Credential Reuse & 5,500-Mile Pipeline Shutdown
Single-factor credential vulnerability breached IT telemetry enclave. Fear of uncontained malware propagation across IT/OT boundary forced Decision_Nodes to execute total physical infrastructure shutdown.
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